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1. Introduction 
Typically, the patient considers the anaesthesia process as risky (Marty, 2003). Indeed, the 
anaesthetist has to understand risks related to the patient and also to the surgery. There are 
many ways to define risks according to the point of view adopted.  
In medical setting, risk can be defined using the ISO 12000-1 and the OSHAS 18001 
standards.  So, risk is defined as a measure of threat expressed in terms of the occurrence of 
an adverse event (i.e. its probability and its frequency) and a measure of its effects or its 
consequences. In anaesthesia, three criteria are commonly used to describe risk: the event 
gravity, the occurrence frequency and the level of acceptability. The first one, the event 
gravity, can be seen as a qualitative scale with 4 major steps: minor risk (i.e. error without 
prejudice for the patient), significant risk (i.e. self–limiting prejudice), major risk (i.e. error 
needing a recovery action) and risk evaluated as serious to critical (i.e. permanent damage). 
The second scale, the occurrence frequency, contains 5 major steps: highly unlikely (i.e. 
frequency≤10-5), very unlikely (i.e. 10-5<frequency≤10-4), unlikely (i.e. 10-4<frequency≤10-
3), probable (i.e. 10-2<frequency≤10-1) and very likely to sure (i.e. >10%). The last one, the 
level of acceptability, is divided into 3 parts: non-critical risks (i.e. acceptable risky 
situations), risks to be monitored (i.e. acceptable risky situations but actions are needed to 
identify and monitor them) and rush through risks (i.e. not acceptable risky situations 
requiring actions to reduce risks or to monitor them).  
In France, there is a step entirely devoted to anaesthesia risk assessment: the pre-anaesthesia 
consultation. But this is a French uniqueness. Indeed, in other countries (e.g. Quebec), the 
anaesthetist will see the patient at the entrance to the operating room. However, the 
anaesthetist may not assess all risks during the anaesthesia consultation. In this chapter, we 
will study how does an anaesthetist assess risks linked to a patient who must have a surgical 
operation before and during this one.  
We will present this chapter as follow. First, we will describe the anaesthesia process in 
France and some epidemiological studies on risks in anaesthesia. Then, we will present 
some cognitive psychology concepts related to planning, information gathering, resilience 
engineering and management (i.e. error detection, identification and recovery). Two studies 
will be presented by the method used and results obtained. The first one concerns a card 
sorting experimentation (with patient records) to understand how anaesthetists gather 
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patient’s files according to their risk. While the second one consists in semi-structured 
interviews revolved on simulated cases using the information on request technique. Finally, 
our results will be discussed in regard of theories used. 
2. The anaesthesia situation 
In this first section, we will present the anaesthesia situation according to the temporal 
organisation of the anaesthetist’s activity situation characteristics and constraints. Finally, 
risks linked to anaesthesia will be presented through epidemiological studies.  
2.1 The anaesthesia process 
Anaesthesia is commonly defined as the administration of medications, called anaesthetics, 
to control pain during a medical procedure or surgery. There are three kind of anaesthesia: 
the local one used for minor surgery; the regional one inducing sedation and, the general 
anaesthesia used for major surgeries and inducing unconsciousness and complete pain 
control. In this chapter, we will mainly focus on general anaesthesia. 
Moreover, the anaesthetist has 3 additional roles. First, he has to work in collaboration with 
the surgeon to evaluate and prepare the patient. Second, he has to provide medical care to 
the patient during the surgery. Finally, he is directly involved in the patient’s management 
after the surgical intervention (Chung & Lam, 1990). According to these roles, 3 phases are 
distinguished: the pre-operatory one, the per-operatory one and the post-operatory phase. 
The figure 1 presents the anaesthesia process in France. 
 
Fig. 1. The anaesthesia process in France 
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2.1.1 The pre-operatory phase  
This phase, the first box on the left, allows the anaesthetist to prepare the patient for the 
surgery and to highlight important elements to consider during this one (Anceaux & 
Beuscart-Zéphir, 2002). Due to the French specificity (for recall, the existence of a specific 
consultation). This first phase is divided into two different steps: the consultation and the 
anaesthetic visit.  
The consultation takes place 2 weeks before the surgery. During this one, the anaesthetist 
looks for information about the patient’s disease through interviews (medical history, 
comorbidities, medication and allergies) and physical examination, establishes a family 
medical history and tries to reassure the patient. This one allows the anaesthetist to 
prescribe additional tests, to adapt the treatment, and if needed, to optimize the patient’s 
health. 
The second step, the anaesthetic visit, takes place the day before or the same day of the 
surgery. Its major aim is to verify the absence of interfering elements occurred between the 
consultation and the visit.   
2.1.2 The per-operatory phase 
This second phase starts when the anaesthetist meets the patient at the entrance to the 
operating room. Two different steps compose this phase. The first one is the anaesthesia 
induction. It means the administration of anaesthetic agents and the establishment of 
adequate depth anaesthesia for surgery. It is an important step physically and mentally 
(McDonald & Dzwonczyk, 1988; McDonald et al., 1990; Gaba & Lee, 1990). Physically 
because a lot of actions are needed (Xiao, 1994): preparation and injection of anaesthetic 
drugs, airway intubation, breathing circuit connections, programing a precise mechanical 
ventilation, etc. Mental workload is also observed. In fact, the patient’s physiological status 
will change very quickly due to injected drugs. To interpret all the information relayed by 
the monitoring and the physical examination, the anaesthetist has to construct a specific 
representation of the patient’s health state. Then, he has to check the data progress.  
The second step of this phase is the maintenance of anaesthesia throughout the medical 
procedure. During this step, the anaesthetist’s main task is to monitor the patient’s vital 
signs and the progress of surgery.  
A task analysis (Neyns, 2011) has highlighted 4 categories of anaesthetists’ observable 
behaviours.  
The first category relates to the anaesthetist’s need to monitor the situation, assess the 
evolution of specific variables, understand the situation, etc. It is the information-gathering 
step. Five sources were underlined: the patient’s record that includes both the pre-anaesthetic 
file (form the consultation and additional assessments) and the per-operative sheet that 
includes all patient data (drugs injected, vital signs, all relevant information); the monitoring 
and its alarms; the surgery status and progress allowing to explain changes in patient’s vital 
signs or to restore the patient’s anaesthesia; information taking on patient (apart from 
monitoring data) used to confirm hypothesis; and information related to hour either to check 
the schedule or to check the drugs effect, or for a personal need. 
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The second category refers to variables that are not directly controlled by the anaesthetist 
(e.g. the conduct of the intervention). He has then to refer to other members in the operating 
room (e.g. surgeon, nurses, surgical assistant, etc.) and to other health care professionals 
who are not directly involved in the surgical procedure (e.g. cardiologist, critical care 
services, recovery room, etc.). It is functional communications between the different 
members. These communications can go from the anaesthetist to other members but also to 
the anaesthetist. The communication objects can be multiple: to provide/exchange 
information, to help the anaesthetist to detect/identify a problem, to discuss plans for the 
previous/present/next patient, etc. 
The third category includes the anaesthetist’s actions on the environment (e.g. actions on 
the monitoring interfaces to facilitate data interpretation or to set to the patient’s vital 
constants, preparation of the equipment, etc.) and the patient (e.g. drugs injections, 
intubation, etc.). His actions are initiated by either obligatory procedure (e.g. prescribed 
tasks), or action plans, or by environment data (e.g. information 
gathering/communication/alarms). Concerning alarms, they play a role in detecting 
problems. Some alarms can be the result of a failure in the patient’s vital signs. The 
anaesthetist will act to restore the situation in a “normal way”. But others can be caused by 
interferences (e.g. the electric scalpel of the surgeon can cause false cardiac dysrhythmia). 
These alarms are ignored because they are not significant and the anaesthetist cannot do 
anything against them. Finally, other alarms prompt the anaesthetist to seek for further 
information (e.g. check the surgeon’ advice about the surgery, an act painful for the patient 
can lead to an increased heart rate).  
Finally, the fourth category includes two types of actions: non-functional actions that are 
not related to the intervention (e.g. reading articles or emails and communications with 
other members, telephone, etc.) and the anaesthetist’s absence from the operating room 
who delegates the process supervising to other members in the operating room. 
Thus, this task analysis shows that the anaesthesia management includes extensive 
information and various parameters can be taken into account. It demonstrates the system 
complexity and its relative reliability.  
2.1.3 The post-operatory phase 
This last phase mainly concerns the patient’s awakening. Once the surgery is completed, the 
anaesthetist has to reverse the effect of anaesthesia as quickly as possible. 
Another characteristic of the anaesthetic process in France is that the anaesthetist involved 
in the anaesthesia consultation will not be necessarily the one on call during the surgery. 
This cooperative activity implies that the anaesthetist in charge of the consultation collects 
relevant information about the patient, builds a representation of this case, plans activities 
and finally chooses the information to convey to his colleague. This information will be 
provided on an anaesthetic file which is used as an external memory (Anceaux et al., 2002 ; 
Thuilliez et al., 2005; Neyns et al., 2010).  
In summary, anaesthesia process is a dynamic and complex work environment sharing 
common characteristics with other dynamics work environments as aviation, car driving 
and nuclear power plants management (Woods, 1988; Vicente, 1999).  
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk Assessment in the Anaesthesia Process 209 
Such situations are highly risky due to their dynamics characteristics. In the next section, we 
will present epidemiological studies on anaesthetic security. 
2.2 Risks in anaesthesia 
As reported by the French Society of Anaesthesiology (SFAR, 2010), the rate of serious 
complications in the world is still 14 millions with a death rate of 2 millions. While some 
studies (Marty, 2003; Amalberti et al., 2005) have shown that anaesthesia was a safe system 
even so there are more difficult patients (older, more complicated diseases, etc.) and more 
complex surgeries, etc. Epidemiological studies have enabled to highlight risky factors in 
anaesthesia (e.g. Cohen et al., 1988 ; Sfez, 2002). 
Classically, two kinds of risks are distinguished: risks in the operating room and out of this 
one. Two predominant factors were highlighted by epidemiological studies (e.g. Cohen et 
al., 1988; Arbous et al., 2001). The first one is the most important in the operatory mortality 
and concerns the patient’s features (physical state, age, gender). The second one is related to 
the surgery difficulty depending on the level of complexity (minor, intermediate, major) and 
the status of surgery (planned or urgent). A third one is also observed: the risk linked to the 
anaesthesia. Three kinds of variables in risks strictly linked to anaesthesia are identified: (1) 
the inadequate assessment and preparation of the patient to the surgery (25%); (2) the 
unsuitable choice of an anaesthetic technique (15%); (3) a wrong recovery action (56%). But 
this last risk is not really salient. More precisely, Lagasse (2002) estimates that the risk 
strictly linked to the anaesthesia is less than 1/10000, while the risk linked to the surgery is 
1/100 to 1/1000 and the one linked to the patient is correlated to the patient’s ASA score1 
(e.g. ASA3 = 1/10000, ASA4 = 5/10000 and ASA5 =14/10000).  
In summary, these results justify the relevance of anaesthetic consultation for the risk 
assessment and the patient’s preparation to the surgery. However, this one is largely 
responsible of some complications (coupled with an inadequate choice of technique 
included in the anaesthetic evaluation). The study led by Zhang et al. (2002) has pointed out 
that the solution to many medical errors was to understand the operator’s cognition and to 
adopt cognitive methodologies to prevent and avoid these errors. In the next section, we 
will present studies in cognitive psychology to highlight the cognitive mechanics involved 
in anaesthesia risks assessment (e.g. anticipation) and risks management (e.g. error detection 
and recovery).   
3. Some psychological concepts about risk management in dynamic 
situation 
In the management of a dynamic situation such as anaesthesia, the time management is 
important (e.g. Carreras et al., 2001). In fact, a dynamic environment can be managed before, 
                                                                 
1 ASA is a physical status classification system for assessing the fitness of patients before surgery. It is a 
six-category classification system. ASA1 for a normal healthy patient; ASA2 for a patient with mild 
systemic disease; ASA3 for a patient with severe systemic disease; ASA4 for a patient with severe 
systemic disease that is a constant threat to life; ASA5 for a moribund patient who is not expected to 
survive without the surgery and ASA 6 for a declared brain-dead patient whose organs are being 
removed for donor purposes.  
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during and even after the process in itself (Morel et al., 2008a, 2008b). The operator has to 
learn to anticipate his actions and especially their effects. However, the different interactions 
between multiple variables do not always allow anticipating all the effects of operator’s 
actions and the system evolution. So the operator must deal with uncertain situations in real 
time and adapt to variables involved in the process and their interactions. This adaptation 
refers to resilience that is defined as the ability of systems to find a stable state after a major 
disturbance and/or in a stressful situation (Hollnagel et al., 2006). According to Cook and 
Woods (1994), the first source of resilience is the human operator. Indeed Reason (2008) 
describes the human operator as “an hero, a system element whose adaptations and compensations 
have brought troubled systems back from the brink of disaster on a significant number of occasions” 
(p.3). In this chapter we will mainly discuss the risk management before and during the 
process.  
3.1 Risks management before the process 
As said earlier, the human operator can perform his task on a reactive mode but also on a 
proactive one. This last one permits to view the situation in the near future (limited by 
operator’s knowledge and the rapid evolution of the process and its uncertainty) and makes 
possible the selection of information (filtering) (Hoc, 1995). We can observe such mode 
before the process with anticipatory activity (plans) but also during this one with the 
implementation of plans built, the preparation of the next action or a sequence of actions 
(Hoc, 2006). According to Cellier et al. (1996), anticipation in a dynamic work environment 
consists in (1) evaluating the future state of a dynamic process, (2) determining the type of 
actions to undertake and the moment when it must be done, and (3) mentally evaluating the 
impact of those actions. Denecker (1999) describes the anticipation on two different modes. 
The first one is considered as an explicit prediction or forecasting. The second one is implicit 
and expressed in a selective preparation to situations or an expectation of events. In this 
chapter, we will mainly focus on the explicit mode.  
Regarding the anaesthesia situation, several studies (Xiao et al., 1997; Neyns et al., 2010) 
have shown that some strategies were built in advance during the pre-anaesthesia phase. 
Xiao et al. (1997) revealed that anaesthetists identified during this phase a list of “points for 
consideration”. This list includes the specific conditions in the patient’s physiology, 
anticipated events, and risks. This one functions then as a set of “warning” that guides the 
anaesthetist’s attention in a dynamic, multi-tasking situation. However, Neyns (et al., 2010) 
showed that this list reflected a wide anticipation range (Boudes & Cellier, 1998). It means 
that this list does not contain planning elements per se, but they can guide attention in the 
anaesthesia activity where timing constraints are important. Thus the information recorded 
by anaesthetists concerns the plans adjustment and little information concerns the 
development or the selection of a plan (Anceaux, et al., 2002). The information contained in 
the consultation files has two distinct purposes: (1) to assess the risk factors and to prevent 
them by the development of strategies (related to the patient and the surgery), and (2) the 
identification of specific problems (Neyns et al., 2010).  
Finally, other studies (Anceaux et al., 2002; Anceaux et al., 2001; Beuscart-Zéphir et al., 2001; 
Thuilliez, et al., 2005) have pointed out that the way to anticipate during the first phase 
depended on the anaesthetist’s expertise and the case complexity.  
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However the limits of projection into the future described above (the knowledge, the rapid 
evolution and the level of uncertainty) also require a reactive mode. This reactive mode 
corresponds to the resilience (Hollnagel et al., 2006) 
3.2 Risks management during the process 
All the risks cannot be anticipated. As we have seen before, certain risks are taken into 
account and actions are proposed (prediction, strategies of avoidance or management) and 
implemented, while others are ignored or not perceived, and their management is 
postponed (if they appear) in the process management. This type of management suggests a 
certain “allostasis risk” (Fuller et al., 2008). This second section aims to understand how 
operators manage risks postponed in the process management.  
Although it is widely accepted that the operator commits many errors (Reason, 1990), he 
also detects the majority of them (at least 60% according to Allwood, 1984; Rizzo et al., 
1987). Error detection is the first step in the risk management during the process. During 
this step, there is still no explanation of the error (Zapf & Reason, 1994). The operator is 
aware of the existence of a gap between what he obtained and what he expected.  
Error detection can be done automatically, spontaneously and unconsciously or it is the 
result of a more aware comparative treatment with the initial objective (in terms of results, 
performance) or when the operator can no longer act on the system (Allwood & 
Montgmery, 1982; Allwood, 1984; Sellen, 1990; Sellen & Norman, 1992; Sellen, 1994; Rizzo et 
al., 1995;). Finally, the intervention of a third person is also a key factor in errors detection 
(Woods, 1984; Nyssen, 1997). 
Sellen (1990, 1994; et al., 1992) suggests that operator, before recovering the error, would be 
able to identify it. This identification process consists in a comparison between results 
obtained and those expected. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the operator detects an 
error without necessarily identify it or to identify it without necessarily recover it. Indeed, a 
significant part of detected but also not detected errors does not have any consequences (or 
little) on the process. Error recovery is often considered as the last step in risk management. 
It allows the operator to remove or reduce the gap between what he gets and what he 
wanted to get. Once the error is detected, recovery actions can take many forms (Sellen, 
1990). But the recovery process will not be detailed in this chapter.  
Regarding the anaesthesia situation, little attention has been paid to the mechanisms of error 
detection. Indeed the majority of research focuses on the study of the errors prevention (e.g. 
Cooper, et al., 1984; De Keyser & Nyssen, 1993; Cooper, et al., 1982; Finley & Cohen, 1991). 
In 2006, Nyssen & Blavier have shown that the majority of incidents were detected during 
the regular monitoring of parameters and on the basis of external signs, suggesting an 
“automatic” mode. The expertise seems also to play a role in error detection (Nyssen & De 
Keyser, 1998). The most experienced ones diagnose the problem with significantly less time 
than novices. 
Finally, most studies about risk management (see Cooper et al., 1984) showed that 
anaesthetists do not taken seriously into account infrequent risks. Risk management 
depends thus mainly on the anaesthetist’s ability to respond quickly and appropriately 
when a problem occurs.  
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In summary, various studies have focused on highlighting either prevention strategies in 
advance or management strategies in real time. But none of them has yet made the 
connection between what is evaluated during the consultation and in the operating room. 
The French anaesthesia situation permits to study this assessment at both phases. More 
specifically, we want to answer the following questions: (1) what kind of risk is used when 
an anaesthetist has to assess a patient’s file? Some studies have emphasized the effect of 
certain variables on the process of risk assessment. For example, Anceaux et al. (2002) 
showed that the case complexity could influence how to proceed with the patient during the 
consultation. Epidemiological studies (e.g. Lagasse, 2002) have also identified three kinds of 
risks as the cause of problems: those related to the patient, surgery and anaesthesia itself. It 
would be interesting to know how anaesthetists assess risks involved according to their 
complexity. (2) Epidemiological studies have shown on the one hand that infrequent risks 
are not taken into account by an anaesthetist (e.g. Cooper et al., 1982) and on the other hand 
that there are often problems when the anaesthetist can assess and prepare a patient (e.g. 
Arbous et al., 2001). How important are the risk frequency and the risk predictability in the 
assessment and the management in real time? 
The next two studies tend to answer these questions and to understand the link between 
consultation and the anaesthesia in itself. 
4. Study one: What kind of criteria does anaesthetist use to assess risks 
linked to a patient based on consultation information?  
This first study aimed to understand how anaesthetists gather patient’s files according to 
their risks. We supposed that information gathering and plans production would depend on 
operators’ level of experience and risks level, without indication about the kind of risks used 
(patient, surgery or anaesthetic). First, we will present the method used to answer our 
question and the method used to treat our data. Finally, we will present results obtained. A 
brief discussion will be proposed to introduce the next study.  
4.1 Method 
We proposed a card-sorting task using patient’s records. All the patient’s files were 
constructed using real patients with the help of an experimented anaesthetist. Four kinds of 
patient’s files were constructed according to the level of complexity defined by 2 combined 
variables: the surgery complexity (easy and complex surgery) and the complexity related to 
the patient’s health (healthy and unhealthy patient).  
An easy surgery is defined as a short-term surgery, minimally invasive (e.g. surgery for a 
breast cancer). A difficult surgery is defined as a long duration surgery (6 to 12hours) that is 
invasive or mutilating (e.g. surgery of the larynx cancer). A healthy patient is described as a 
normal healthy patient (e.g. ASA1) or with mild systemic disease (e.g. ASA2). The patient 
with a complex health status is a patient with important comorbidities and taking many 
drugs (e.g. ASA3 or 4).  
Combining these 2 variables, 4 kinds of cases were obtained: easy surgery with healthy patient 
(called OSPS); easy surgery with unhealthy patient (called OSPC); complex surgery with 
healthy patient (called OCPS) and, complex surgery with unhealthy patient (called OCPC). 
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Each patient’s file contained the following information in the same order: surgery information 
(name, operating position, surgery duration, type of intervention, risk of infection, latex 
allergy); patient’s information (gender, age, weight/height, medications, comorbidities, other 
allergies, dentures, medical and surgical histories); data form the clinical examination 
(cardiovascular, pulmonary, intubation, risk of post-operative nausea and vomiting, remarks); 
conclusion made according to information from consultation (ASA score).  
Sixteen patient’s records (4 records by kind of cases) were constructed and presented in a 
random order. Anaesthetists were asked to sort them into several distinct groups such as 
they “go well together” using the think aloud method. At the end of the task, they had to 
explain their choices of categories giving them a title.  
Twenty anaesthetists volunteers participated: 10 experienced anaesthetists (average years of 
experience=21.2, SD=6.23) and 10 novices (average years of experience=4.2, SD=0.4). They 
all came from different departments and different medical structures. They were recruited 
by mail or by phone. The entire experience lasted up to 30 minutes. 
Data will be first analysed according to the produced categories: number of categories and 
titles given to each category. Then, information used to produce categories will be recorded 
and compared according to the level of experience. Finally, verbalizations will be analysed as a 
material language and exploited through an approach of natural language processing (NPL). 
This use of NPL is in line with works on texts profiling (see Planes, 2011). We wanted to 
highlight experts’ and novices’ profiles answering the following question: What kind of 
information the two groups use when they assess a patient’s file? Lexico, a language tool for 
analysing corpus, will be used (see Lebart & Salem, 1994). This tool allows to manipulate some 
statistical calculation on corpus (more particularly frequencies) and to calculate specificities (in 
other words, “are some terms more specific to experimented anaesthetists than novices?”).  
4.2 Results 
In this second subsection, we will firstly present categories produced by the two groups of 
anaesthetists according to their number and their titles. Finally, information used from their 
verbalisation data will be explained with the Natural Language Processing (NLP).  
4.2.1 Produced categories 
Anaesthetists construct different categories according to their level of experience. The more 
experienced anaesthetists build more categories (M=4.4, SD=0.52) than novices (M=3.5, 
SD=0.53). The t-test applied to the data confirms that the level of experience influences the 
differentiation between patient’s records (t(18)=3.86, p<0.001, d=1.8).   
Regarding the titles of categories, a difference is observed according to the level of 
experience. The table 1 and 2 show labels given to the categories formed by the two groups, 
the participants’ number giving this label and the average number of reports in each 
category formed.  
Looking to the first table, categories made by experimented anaesthetists, it seems that they 
mainly use the surgery difficulty and the risk level associated to patient’s health. Some other 
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categories can highlight specific problems (e.g. neurological problems, attention to the 
induction time).  
 
Categories Label Participants’ 
number
Average number 
of reports 
Easy surgery, healthy patient 10 5.8 
Easy surgery but patient with mild systemic disease 8 3.4 
Surgery moderately complex with minor risks 8 2.1 
Complex surgery with major risks 10 4.4 
Neurological problems 1 4 
Very difficult case 2 2.5 
Attention to the induction time 2 2.5 
Table 1. Categories made by experimented anaesthetists 
 
Categories Label Participants’ 
number
Average number 
of reports 
Not at risk 8 5.5 
Low level of risk  6 4.5 
Long surgery, low-risk patient 2 3 
Very high risk 10 4.7 
Intermediate risks 4 4.25 
Additional tests 1 2 
Post-operative management 1 1 
Particular intubation 1 3 
Table 2. Categories made by novices 
Regarding the second table, categories made by novices, it seems that they manly used the 
overall risks and do not really distinguish what is related to the surgery and to the patient. 
There is just one category that includes this differentiation, the category named “long 
surgery and low-risk patient”, but it is poorly used (just 2 novices with an average of 3 
reports). Finally, they also use some categories highlighting specific problems (e.g. 
additional tests, post-operative management, particular intubation).  
In summary, 90% of experimented anaesthetists distinguish the difficulty of the surgery and 
risks linked to the patient’s health state, while 60% of novices suggest the overall risk 
associated with patient’s files. According to the number of categories formed and qualitative 
analysis of labels, experimented anaesthetists use more differentiations between records 
than do novices. In the next subsection, we will present how anaesthetists analyse a patient’s 
file through the natural language processing.  
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4.2.2 Information used by the two groups 
This subsection concerns the information use to assess patient’s files.  
The table 3 shows the average number of information used according to the cases and the 
anaesthetists’ level of experience. Even if there is an augmentation of the information used 
according to the level of complexity (F(3,54)=66.09, p<0.0001, f=1.92), there is no effect of the 
level of experience on the number of information used (F(1,18)=1,09, NS, f=0.25).  
 
  OSPS OSPC OCPS OCPC Average 
  N M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Experimented 10 19.8 3.08 30.3 2.94 31 3.22 37.3 4.95 27.1 
Novices 10 24.9 4.68 36.4 5.03 26.7 4.24 33.5 3.82 30.38 
Table 3. Average number of information used according to the level of complexity and the 
anaesthetists' level of experience 
According to the NLP, the figure 2 shows frequencies of criteria used by the two groups 
(experimented and novices) in their verbalization data. Results show that experimented 
anaesthetists use 4 different criteria. They use more frequently the patient criteria 
(frequency=406), followed by the surgery criteria (frequency=217), the risk criteria 
(frequency=138) and finally, the problem criteria (frequency=118). Novices use also 4 
different criteria. They use more frequently the surgery criteria (frequency=373), directly 
followed by the patient criteria (frequency=321) and less often the risk (frequency=100) and 
the problems criteria (frequency=57). 
 
Fig. 2. Frequencies of criteria used to assess patient's files according to the level of 
experience (verbalization data) 
As showed on the figure 1, two major differences appear between the two groups. 
Experimented anaesthetists mainly use the patient criteria when they have to assess a case, 
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while novices use the surgery and the patient criteria without significant distinction. Finally, 
experimented anaesthetists and novices assess not only risks but they also highlight some 
specific problems to consider, even if the experimented ones use it more often. This last 
difference has a particular interest for us: either novices do not look at these particular 
problem as much as experts, or they use other words to describe these elements due to a 
difference in the vocabulary used.  
The figure 3, called problems frequencies underlined by experimented anaesthetists and 
novices, shows that the two groups highlight all the problems. But the experimented ones 
underline problems more often than do novices (4 kinds of problems are more often cited by 
experimented anaesthetists while novices identified only two kinds most frequently).  
 
Fig. 3. Problems frequencies underlined by experimented anaesthetists and novices 
In summary, it appears that novices look the same information in the records than 
experimented anaesthetists. However, novices consider them less frequently as problems 
and analyse it as a whole. This suggests the existence of different strategies among 
experience level. With experience, anaesthetists can focus only on the potentially 
problematic aspects of patient’s files.  
4.3 Brief discussion of the first study 
This first study permits to put in light differences in the risk assessment. In fact, the level of 
experience seems to be a relevant factor in it. As developed through epidemiological 
studies, our results insist on difficulties linked to the patient’s health state and the surgery. 
Anaesthetists, whatever their level of experience, use these two criteria more frequently. 
However, the more experimented anaesthetists seem to insist on patient’s risks factors than 
novices. These last ones seem to use both of these criteria to assess risk linked to one case. 
Finally, risk assessment is also a way to put some warning flags on points for consideration. 
That confirms Xiao’s results (1996).  
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5. Study two: How does an anaesthetist assess risks during a surgical 
intervention? 
The first study was only focused on the risk assessment that can occur during the 
consultation. This second study aims to investigate it during all the anaesthesia process. We 
wanted to see how anaesthetists assess a predictable risk and how they do when they face 
an unpredictable risk. We supposed that anaesthetists would pay more attention to a 
predictable risk than to an unpredictable one. This attention would be clearly observed in 
the risk assessment during the consultation and also, in the risk management (during the 
surgery) by a better detection/identification. First, we will present the method chosen to 
answer our question and finally, we will present and discuss briefly a part of our results.  
5.1 Method 
This second study consists of semi-structured interviews revolved on simulated cases 
(already validated in Sfez, et al., 2008) using the technique of information on request (see 
Rimoldi, 1963). These cases were presented on vignettes that described an anaesthetic 
situation that deviated form its normal course.  
Cases were selected based on two criteria: the frequency of occurrence and the 
predictability. Four cases were used in the experiment: the case of difficult intubation 
(predictable or not) and the case of malignant hyperthermia (predictable or not). The first 
case, difficult intubation, is a common situation. Moreover anaesthetists have to evaluate the 
intubation criteria during the consultation through patient’s body inspection (mouth 
opening, length of upper incisors, relation of maxillary and mandibular incisors during 
normal jaw closure and during voluntary protrusion of mandible, intercisor distance, 
visibility of uvula, shape of palate, compliance of mandibular space, thyromental distance, 
length and thickness of neck, and range of motion of head and neck) and patient’s interview 
(familial history). They also have a difficult airway algorithm (developed by the French 
Society of Anaesthesia) allowing them to choose an adequate technique according to the 
patient’s criteria.  In this simulation, the case of difficult intubation was coupled with gastric 
oesophageal reflux, which occurs if the anaesthetist does not practice preventive 
manoeuvre.  
The second case, malignant hyperthermia, was chosen because it is a rare life threatening 
condition in anaesthesia but it can be detected during the consultation.  It is usually 
triggered by exposure to certain drugs used for general anaesthesia. There are also 
algorithms that manage this risk (strategies for prevention, avoidance and recovery actions). 
In the case presented, the anaesthetist can either detect the problem during the consultation, 
either during the anaesthetic induction with warning signs as muscle stiffness, difficulty of 
intubation due to spasms, breathing problems, increasing of the patient’s body temperature 
and arrhythmias.  
Each vignette was divided into 3 phases. The first one was related to the preoperative 
phase during which the anaesthetist has to be aware of the patient’s physical conditions 
before to put him to sleep and has to determine an action plan to intervene. This phase 
corresponded to the anaesthesia consultation and to the risk that a problem could appear. 
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After a brief description of the case including age, weight, height, the surgery planned 
and the position required, four questions were asked to the anaesthetist. (1) What 
information do you need to assess risks linked to this patient? (2) On a scale of 0 to 10 
(where 0 means “very easy” and 10 “very difficult”) can you estimate the difficulty level 
for this case?  (3) What are the difficulties envisaged? (4) Do you recommend some 
specific actions for this patient? (Additional strategies: surveillance, specific preparation, 
etc.). In summary, the anaesthetist was asked to assess risk level associated to this patient 
and to highlight problems expected.  
The second phase was related to the anaesthesia induction. During this phase, the 
problem really appeared. After reading the description of the situation, three questions 
were asked to the anaesthetist. (1) Do you need additional information? (2) Are you 
concerned about some elements of the current patient’s state and the surgery? Could you 
explain the reason? (3) Are there specific actions to implement? In summary, the 
anaesthetist had to provide details about his situation awareness, to formulate hypotheses 
and to suggest recovery actions.  
The last phase concerned the anaesthesia maintenance. This one is related to the recovery 
situation. During this third phase, if the anaesthetist did not make anything, the situation 
will not be anymore recoverable. After reading the vignette, four questions were asked to 
the anaesthetist. (1) Do you need more information? (2) Do you need to do something in this 
situation? (3) On a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 means “very easy” and 10 means “very 
difficult”) can you estimate the level of difficulty of the case you just faced? (4) Do you think 
you could change the course of this event? If so, could you explain how? 
The figure 4 presents an example of vignette about an infrequent but predictable problem, 
the malignant hyperthermia case. 
All the interviews were recorded. Each anaesthetist was faced with a vignette presented in a 
random order.  Thirty-four French anaesthetists participated to our study (average years of 
experience = 17.12, SD = 11.02). They all came from different departments and different 
medical structures. They were recruited by mail or by phone. The duration of the entire 
experience lasted up to 10 minutes or 15 minutes. 
Data will be analysed as follow. First we will present the anaesthetists risk assessment 
(the estimation scale of 0 to 10 at the beginning and at the end of the simulation) of the 
patient according to the two variables: predictability and frequency. There will be also a 
qualitative treatment of this assessment to demonstrate if the anaesthetist had taken into 
account or not difficulties presented in the vignette (e.g. in the case of difficult intubation, 
if the anaesthetist diagnosed it in the first stage, he has adequately understood the 
problem. It is noted 1. Conversely, if the real risk is not taken into account, it is noted 0). 
Finally, the risk management will be apprehended by 2 kinds of variables: the quality of 
the detection, identification and recovery actions proposed by anaesthetists and, the 
number of hypotheses generated. It tends to answer the following questions: “Does the 
anaesthetist identify correctly the problem?” and “Does the anaesthetist use the correct 
recovery actions according to specific algorithms?”. It means that if the proposed 
diagnosis and recovery actions are correct, they are rated 1. In the opposite, if they are 
false, they are rated 0.   
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Fig. 4. The infrequent but predictable problem: the malignant hyperthemia vignette 
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5.2 Results 
We will present in this chapter only the results concerning risk assessment before and 
during the anaesthesia.  
5.2.1 Risk assessment during the patient’s consultation 
The table 4 shows the average level of difficulty estimated by the anaesthetists according to 
the frequency and the predictability. As expected, a predictable event is always considered 
as more risky (M=4.06, SD=1.52) than if it was not predictable (M=2.18, SD=1.19). In fact, the 
t-test shows that this difference is extremely statistically significant (t(32)=4.02, p<0.0005, 
d=0.468). In general, the same is observed for the frequency: a common risk is assessed as 
more difficult (M=3.35, SD=1.9) than an infrequent one (M=2.88, SD=1.36). But by 
conventional criteria, this difference is not statistically significant according to the t-test 
(t(32)=0.83, NS, d=0.57).  
 
 Frequent Infrequent General mean (SD) 
Predictable 4.88 (SD=1.25) 3.33 (SD=1.41) 4.06 (SD=1.52) 
Unpredictable 2 (SD=1.22) 2.38 (SD=1.19) 2.18 (SD=1.19) 
General Mean (SD) 3.35 (SD=1.9) 2.88 (SD=1.36)  
Table 4. Average level of difficulty according to the frequency and the predictability 
Specifically, two major differences appear. Predictable risks are considered as more difficult 
when they are frequent (M=4.88, SD=1.25) than when they are infrequent (M=3.33, 
SD=1.41). This difference is statically significant by the t-test applied (t(15)=2.38, p<0.05, 
d=0.65). The same is observed concerning the frequent risk. They are considered as more 
difficult when they are predictable (M=4.88, SD=1.25) than the reverse (M=2, SD=1.22). By 
conventional criteria, this difference is considered to be extremely statistically significant 
(t(15)=4.8, p<0.0005, d=0.6).  
Regarding the quality of their risk assessments, only 35.3 % of the anaesthetists correctly 
assess the risk they face and mainly when the risk is frequent and predictable (7 
anaesthetists have a correct assessment against 1 who is wrong). Typically, risks identified 
are mostly distorted by other problems than those presented in vignettes.  
5.2.2 Risk assessment during the surgery 
Although risks are not correctly identified at the consultation, when problem arises, the 
majority of the anaesthetists (97%) identified that there was a problem but only 79.4% of the 
anaesthetists identified correctly the problem they faced.  
In general, all the risks are correctly identified. As shown on the figure 5, frequent risks are 
always identified correctly (100%). Anaesthetists frequently recognized predictable and 
unpredictable risks (respectively, 83,33% and 75%). The most difficult risk to identify is the 
one that is infrequent (58,33%) and mainly when it could not be foreseen during the 
consultation (25%).  
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Fig. 5. Percentage of risks correctly identified according to their predictability and their 
frequency 
In average, anaesthetists have advanced 2.24 hypotheses before giving the correct diagnosis 
(SD=1.16). As shown in the table 5, whatever the frequency or the predictability, there is no 
difference in the number of hypotheses.  
 
 Frequent Infrequent Mean (SD) 
Predictable 2 (SD=0.93) 2.89 (SD=1.36) 2.47 (SD=1.23) 
Unpredictable 1.89 (SD=0.93) 2.13 (SD=1.25) 2 (SD=1.06) 
Mean (SD) 1.94 (SD=0.9) 2.53 (SD=1.33)  
Table 5. Means of hypotheses generated according to the predictability and the frequency 
(SD) 
Concerning the recovery, three results are interesting to quote. First, 3 anaesthetists did not 
attempt to recover the problem. Second, even if 97% of the anaesthetists identified the risks, 
only 67.6% of them were able to recover the problem presented. As shown on the figure 6, 
anaesthetists recovered correctly 94,44% of frequent risks and more often when the risk was 
predictable (50%). Finally, the less managed risk is the infrequent one (40,97% of 
anaesthetists were able to provide adequate recovery actions) regardless of its predictability 
(22,22%) or not (18,75%).  
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Fig. 6. Percentage of correct recovery actions according to the predicatbility and the 
frequency 
5.3 Brief discussion of the second study 
In this second study, we wanted to see how anaesthetists assessed risks before and during 
the surgery. We were interested by two kinds of variables: the predictability and the 
occurrence frequency. Our results showed that anaesthetists assessed problems as more 
risky when they can anticipate it than when they are unforeseeable. However, few 
anaesthetists were able to correctly assess the risks during the consultation. In fact, their 
representation were often distorted by others problems. It means that they put a lot of 
warning flags for each case. One variable seem relevant in the risk assessment and 
management: the frequency. A frequent risk is always correctly identified and recovered.  
In the following section, all the results will be explained regarding the theories used.  
6. General discussion 
The main objective pursued in this article was to emphasize the risk assessment during the 
consultation (phase 1 of the process) and during the anaesthesia (phase 2). More specifically, 
2 questions have structured our work: (1) what kind of risk is used when anaesthetist has to 
assess a patient’s file? (2) How important are the risk frequency and the risk predictability in 
the assessment and the management in real time? 
The first research permits us to answer the first question and to study the effect of the 
experience level on the risk assessment. Our analyses show that the most experimented 
anaesthetists differentiate more patients’ files regarding to the number of categories formed, 
the labels given and their verbalizations. Concerning the kinds of risks used, the 
experimented anaesthetists use most often the complexity linked to the patient to assess a 
file whereas novices use a more general level of risk without distinction between patient, 
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surgery and anaesthesia risk, even if their verbalizations show that they use the patient and 
the surgery criteria with almost the same frequency. Both of them use more information 
according to the files complexity. Finally, the two groups of anaesthetists use some warning 
flags to underline some specific problems.  
Through this study, our results show that the more experimented anaesthetists build more 
functional representations because they analyse the situation more broadly. This confirms 
the results of Cellier et al. (1997) and Hoc (1989). In other words, experimented anaesthetists 
consider two levels of risk (the patient and the surgery) even if they use more often the 
criteria related to the patient. That should enable them to anticipate potential incidents 
associated with the patient and the surgery.   
Our results also confirm that two variables can influence the consultation (Anceaux et al., 
2001, 2002, 2005): the level of experience and the case complexity. Finally, regarding 
information used by anaesthetists (all experience level combined) to assess a file, they all 
point out specific problems. This last point confirms Xiao’s results (et al., 1997).  
All these elements show that the risk assessment during the consultation leads to a 
schematic representation that can be then specified later during the surgery (Hoc, 1987).  
The second research permits to answer the second question (How important are the risk 
frequency and the risk predictability in the assessment and the management in real time?). 
Our results indicate that the risk predictability increases the perceived difficulty level 
associated with it. Moreover this perceived difficulty is higher when the risk is both 
frequent and predictable. The risk frequency seems to be important for the identification 
during the surgery and also for the recovery actions.  
Overall, few anaesthetists assess the problem correctly at the end of the consultation (for 
recall: only 35.9% of anaesthetists assess the real risk). Anaesthetists correctly assess only 
frequent and predictable risks at this early stage. Concerning the other risks, the 
anaesthetist’s representation is distorted by other problems. Even if the risk is not really 
perceived during the consultation, the identification is almost correct for all the 
anaesthetists. We also find that anaesthetists identified and recovered less correctly the 
infrequent risks.  
Finally our results point out that anaesthetists suggest that anaesthetists propose several 
hypotheses before reaching the right result whatever the nature of the risk according to its 
frequency and its predictability.  
These results confirm epidemiological and psychological studies previously cited. In fact, 
several explanations can be given to our results. Firstly, previsability permits to assess 
(consultation) and to identify (surgery) correctly the risks. Secondly, as Cooper’s results (et 
al., 1982) showed, anaesthetists not taken into account infrequent risks. These ones are not 
correctly assessed, identified and recovered because there is a misunderstanding. Indeed the 
majority of anaesthetists faced with a infrequent risk explained that they have been rarely 
confronted with this kind of risk and most often through simulations. Thus, when the 
patient presented signs of this problem, they tended to minimize the facts (Amalberti, et al., 
2005). Moreover, their representation seems distorted by highlighting other problems 
(points for consideration, Xiao, et al., 1997). Finally, frequent and predictable risks are most 
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often correctly assessed, dectected and recovered. The explanation lies in algorithms 
developed and the current practice that allow the anaesthetist to identify problems quickly 
(by information filtering).  
7. Conclusion 
Two questions were asked at the beginning of this chapter and one aim was pursued. 
Regarding anticipation performed by anaesthetists, we wanted first to highlight the explicit 
elements of anticipation. However, the results show that the anaesthetist has on the one 
hand, explicit predictions about specific events and on the other hand, builds expectations 
that are not clearly communicated (implicit expectations) but known as points for 
consideration. This result confirms a certain “risk allostasis” (Fuller, et al., 2008). Further 
analysis (Neyns, 2011) enables us to explain this risk allostasis through the availability of 
algorithms developed by scientific societies such as SFAR (French Society of Anaesthesia) or 
the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). These algorithms allow the anaesthetist to 
manage promptly when a problem occurs. For example, the management algorithm of 
malignant hyperthermia describs all the symptoms and strategies to use for stopping the 
crisis.  
Thus, during the consultation all the risks are not assessed but it allows the anesthetist to 
put warning on specific problems that may arise. The anaesthetist therefore has a schematic 
representation and uses generic and abstract plans with a particularisation in real time 
(Anceaux et al., 2002; Thuilliez et al., 2005; Van Daele & Carpinelli, 2001). This means that 
during the intervention, this representation is the result of filtering information and a 
highlighting of risks. Throughout the surgery, the anesthetist will complete this 
representation with contextual information. Finally, when a problem occurs, anaesthetists 
tend to put routines in place to assess the situation (algorithms, hypothesis generation). We 
also observed, whatever the risks they face (frequent/infrequent, predictable/unpredictable) 
anaesthetists tend to explain the situation using several hypotheses. This result 
demonstrates that the situation of anesthesia is a complex situation where multiple variables 
interact and can be the source of several problems. Moreover, epidemiological studies 
pointed out that there were problems arising from inadequate evaluation and a bad 
patient’s preparation for surgery. Our results tend to show that it can only be part of a 
highlighting of several risks as those actually involved. The anaesthetists’ representation is 
distorted by some points for consideration when they have to assess the situation. Another 
study (Neyns, 2011) shows that certain events (such as difficult intubation) could be due to a 
misidentification according to qualitative judgments on criteria. 
But these first results cannot attest to the necessity or not of a preanesthetic consultation but 
allow to emphase the importance of the anaesthetists’ experience and the need to develop 
habits of action (Norros & Klemola, 1999) to recognise and manage some cases. For example, 
the infrequent risks. Because rare does not mean impossible, it is important to establish 
some specific training through simulations, conference, seminar, etc. In another study 
(Neyns, 2011) we compared the risk management between France (with consultation) and 
Quebec (without specific anaesthesia consultation). This study showed that in Quebec they 
have developed specific patterns of actions that allow them to quickly manage the problem, 
even if they took longer time to identify the problem.   
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk Assessment in the Anaesthesia Process 225 
This chapter, in line with the work on resilience, contributes to a positive view of risk 
management in anaesthesia. The operator is a central key to the system resilience, not only in 
terms of preparation but also in real-time management. It points out adaptation strategies to 
the system variabilities by a proactive identification of risk factors and reactive strategies in 
response to changes of the patient’s health conditions (Patterson et al., 2010).   
Finally, the use of different approaches to address resilience is relevant, it permits to obtain 
and confront additional information. It is interesting to use several techniques to obtain 
additional information. However, methods used are subject to numerous biases. The 
categorization of files can not really be considered as a consultation. The patient was not 
present, the anesthetist has to build his representation on written data, not physical or verbal 
ones. In the simulation, the anesthetist is confronted alone to the case but it is a team-work 
where detection by a third person is very important. Thus, detection strategies could not be 
identified. Moreover, in this second study, we focused on the risks occurring in the operating 
room. It is clear that these risks also require increased monitoring after surgery because they 
can affect the patient’s health. However, for purposes of the study, the simulation did not take 
into account the latter period. 
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